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Abstract—Black Box Machine Learning models leak informa-
tion about the proprietary model parameters and architecture,
both through side channels and output predictions. An adversary
can thus, exploit this leakage to reconstruct a substitute architec-
ture similar to the target model, violating the model privacy and
Intellectual Property. However, all such attacks, infer a subset
of the target model attributes and identifying the rest of the
architecture and parameters (optimally) is a search problem.
Extracting the exact target model is not possible owing to the
uncertainty in the inference attack outputs and stochastic nature
of the training process.
In this work, we propose a probabilistic framework, AIRAVATA,
to estimate the leakage in such model extraction attacks. Specifi-
cally, we use Bayesian Networks to capture the uncertainty, under
the subjective notion of probability, in estimating the target model
attributes using various model extraction attacks. We experimen-
tally validate the model under different adversary assumptions
commonly adopted by various model extraction attacks to reason
about the attack efficacy. Further, this provides a practical ap-
proach of inferring actionable knowledge about extracting black
box models and identify the best combination of attacks which
maximise the knowledge extracted (information leaked) from the
target model. The code and the data used for experiments are
available at https://gitlab.com/vduddu/BayesModelExtraction.
Index Terms—Model Extraction Attacks, Machine Learning
Privacy, Information Leakage, Uncertainty Modelling, Bayesian
Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Neural Networks undergo an iterative design and devel-
opment process to achieve state of the art performance on
a human level complex task like speech or object recogni-
tion, tracking and identification. Companies invest significant
human resource and capital to design these neural networks
making them an important Intellectual Property. For instance,
Amazon, Google, BigML and Microsoft have adopted the
business paradigm of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS).
These models are provided as a commercial service to the
customers on a pay-per-query basis, making these black box
models of significant commercial value to motivated adver-
saries.
Extracting the knowledge (both architecture and param-
eters) present in these Machine Learning models enables
an adversary to mount various other security and privacy
attacks. For instance, given the approximate architecture of the
target model, an adversary can generate effective transferable
adversarial examples against black box models [28], mount
membership privacy attacks to identify whether a data point
was part of the training data or not [31][30] and extract
the inputs passed to the model [36][11][15]. This makes the
theoretical study of model extraction important for designing
effective defences. Further, a theoretical analysis provides
the relative risks of different attack types against black box
models.
In order to successfully mount a model extraction attack, the
adversary’s goal is to extract the knowledge, which includes
both the hyperparameters (architecture) and the weights or
parameters (functionality) of the target model. In a black
box setting, such as MLaaS, the adversary can only query
the target model through an API and get the corresponding
output predictions. Here, machine learning based models can
be trained to infer the target model attributes based on the
input-output pairs [26] or iteratively solving the equations
for unknown parameter variables to extract the functionality.
However, under the stronger assumption where the adversary
has access to the hardware executing the model, side channel
leakage such as power consumption [4], timing channels
[10] and cache side channels [38][16] can be exploited. The
question that we aim to address in this work is,
How much knowledge about the target model can an
adversary infer from model extraction attacks?
In other words,
How much information does a machine learning
model leak under different model extraction attacks?
Each of the previously proposed model extraction can infer
only a subset of the total attributes of the target model. Fur-
ther, for machine learning based attacks, there is an inherent
uncertainty (noise) in making predictions about the target
model attributes [24]. This makes estimating the target model
architecture and parameters uncertain. Despite (hypothetically)
knowing the exact black box architecture, the training pro-
cess to steal the model functionality (parameters) such as
knowledge distillation and active learning [14], are inherently
stochastic due to which the substitute model performance is
not exactly the same as the target model [19]. Hence, in
order to quantify the knowledge extracted by the adversary
or information leaked by the model through various model
extraction attack, it is important to mathematically capture
these uncertainties.
Contributions. We propose a probabilistic framework,
AIRAVATA, to quantify the information leakage about the
model parameters and architecture by capturing the uncer-
tainty in extracting model attributes using model extraction
attacks. In order to mathematically model uncertainties in dif-
ferent variables, we use probabilistic graphical models [13]. In
this paper, we focus on Bayesian Networks which capture the
uncertainties in variables using probability distributions and
encode the relation between different variables in a Directed
Acyclic Graph.
AIRAVATA combines various model extraction attacks con-
sidered as variables of the Bayesian Network which allows
to estimate the total extracted knowledge (or information
leaked) from the target model. This specifically helps to
analyse different possible combinations of attacks and reason
about their effectiveness in extracting the model. In a game
between an attacker and defender, this analysis is of significant
importance for identifying the optimal combination of attacks
to maximise target model leakage, and accordingly set up
defences.
Frequentist view of probability to model uncertainty re-
quires large amount of data. Instead, we use subjective notion
of probability where we measure probability as the belief
of occurrence of a particular event. On performing different
attacks, the adversary obtains incomplete knowledge about
the target model. Hence, considering the collective opinion of
multiple attack vectors helps to iteratively move from black
box (incomplete knowledge) to white box (complete knowl-
edge). We experimentally validate our model by implementing
a Bayesian Network to fit the data capturing relation between
different attacks and corresponding inferred attributes. In this
paper, we focus on Neural Networks due to its huge parameter
space, but can be extended to other black box algorithms
including cryptographic protocols.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Machine Learning
Given the space of data instances X and space of corre-
sponding ground truth labels Y , the goal of Machine Learning
algorithms is to learn a classification function f : X −→ Y
that accurately maps the data samples in X to its correspond-
ing class in Y . This is modelled as an optimisation problem
where the parameters are computed by minimising the loss
function l(f(x), y) over each data instance (x, y) by capturing
the difference in model’s prediction f(x) and the ground truth
label y. Instead of performing the optimisation on the entire
data population P (X,Y ), we estimate the loss (LD) over the
training dataset D ⊂ X ×Y where each data point (x, y)
i.i.d
∼
D.
However, machine learning models tend to overfit on the
training data, i.e, the accuracy on the training data is much
higher than the accuracy on evaluation (previously unseen)
data [5]. To ensure that the model does not overfit, a regular-
isation function (J) is added to the loss function making the
final optimisation as,
min
f
LD + λJ (1)
Deep Learning. Deep Neural Networks are a class of
machine learning algorithms comprising of multiple com-
putational units, called nodes (neurones), arranged in layers
which are stacked sequentially. Each node performs matrix-
vector multiplication between the updated parameter matrix
and corresponding input activation from the previous layer.
This computation is followed by an activation function which
restricts the output from growing too large.
The architecture details (hyperparameters) of the Neural
Networks play a significant role in determining the perfor-
mance. Learning Rate (α) determines scales the loss gradient
and controls the extent of weight updates during training of
the network, θ ← θ−α∂J(θ)
∂θ
where J(θ) is the loss computed
between the predicted values and the ground truth labels.
Weight Decay (λ) parameter controls the balance between
regularisation and the loss function (shown in Equation 1).
The number of layers in the Network (depth) and the total
number of nodes in each layers are important hyperparameters
which determine the overall learning capacity of the model.
There are different types of activation functions that can be
used to restrict the matrix vector computation performed by
each node like ReLU , Sigmoid or Tanh to a fixed range
of output values. Further, in case of Convolutional Neural
Networks, the type of layers like convolutional, maxpool or
fully connected layer play an important role in determining
the model complexity. Finally, the choice of loss functions like
cross-entropy, mean-squared error along with the optimisation
technique used like ADAM, SGD and RMSprop determine
the final performance of the Neural Network architecture.
After training the entire neural network, keeping the above
architectural details fixed, the final parameters or weights after
updates determine the performance of the model.
To reconstruct or steal the functionality of a target neural
network, an adversary is required to extract (a) the architec-
tural attributes or hyperaparameters and (b) the final updated
parameters after training. The large number of attributes of
the target model make model extraction attacks complex and
challenging.
B. Probabilistic Graphical Models
Complex systems are characterised by multiple inter-related
attributes which are considered as random variables to capture
various uncertainties in the system. The goal is to reason about
the hypothesis variable based on some prior observations.
The entire system can be modelled using the joint probability
distribution over the set of random variables X but computing
the entire distribution is computationally expensive, especially,
for high dimensional networks with large number of variables.
For instance, assuming that each of the N random variables in
set X is binary, the total number of possibilities is 2N . Alter-
natively, Probabilistic Graphical Models encode the complex
joint probability distribution over a high dimensional space
compactly using a graphical structure [21][13]. The nodes
in the graphs represent the random variables characterising
the complex system while the (lack of) edges between the
nodes represent the conditional dependence or independence
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assumptions. Since, in our attack modelling, there exists a
cause-effect relationship between the attacks and the inferred
model attributes, we use directed acyclic graphical models,
specifically, Bayesian Belief Networks. These networks estab-
lish causality between different random variables on a solid
mathematical foundation [29].
DEFINITION 1. A Bayesian Network is a Directed Acyclic
Graph G = (V,E) with a random variable xi ∀ i ∈ V charac-
terised by a conditional probability distribution p(xi|pA(xi))
per node specifying the probability of xi conditioned on
all the parent nodes pA. The joint probability distribution
p(x1, x2, . . . , xn) can be written as,
p(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi|pai). (2)
Using the chain rule, we can expand it as the product of
factors,
p(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = p(x1)p(x2 | x1) · · · p(xn | xn−1, . . . , x2, x1)
(3)
Bayesian Networks are a natural choice to model problems
with uncertainty and causal relation between the variables.
Firstly, Bayesian Networks can learn from sparse and in-
complete datasets by probabilistically encoding dependen-
cies between variables. Secondly, the networks encode the
causal relationship to help reason and infer about the prior
knowledge. Further, Bayesian Networks provide declarative
representation by encoding the system details while enabling
algorithms to infer and reason about the knowledge captured
in the models.
Structure Representation. Structure learning algorithms
search the structure of the graphical network and identify
the dependencies of different variables on each other given
the data. This is typically done by defining a score function,
for instance based on log-likelihood of the data and search
among different DAGs for a structure which maximises the
score and search for the optimal structure using either a greedy
or local search. Alternatively, the constraint based approach
defines constraints on the edges of the graph and then finds
the optimal graph that fits those constraints. Constraint based
approach however, requires significantly higher data compared
to score based learning. In this work, however, we build the
graph structure based on our subjective knowledge about the
domain due to the small number of variables in the proposed
models.
Parameter Learning. Given the structure of the graph,
the goal is to estimate the factors (conditional probability
distribution) corresponding to each of the node which make
up the joint probability distribution. In this work, we focus
on Bayesian parameter estimation which explicitly models
uncertainty over the node variables xi as well as the parameters
of the Bayesian network. The parameters θ are considered a
random variable which follow a prior distribution p(θ) which
encodes our subjective beliefs [23]. This deviates from the
frequentist notion of probability which requires to enumerate
all possibilities for a given hypothesis which is not possible
for complex systems with exponential number of cases and
partial observability. For each data point from the dataset, the
model updates it prior beliefs using the Bayes’ rule,
p(θ | D) =
p(D | θ) p(θ)
p(D)
(4)
Here, the prior distribution assumed for the parameters θ is
Dirichlet distribution which is iteratively updated based on
new data samples, i.e, P (θ) = Dirichlet(θ|α) where α is a
set of hyperparameters for the distribution. This is specifically
useful to our case of model extraction attacks where the data
for training the Bayesian model is limited.
Inference. Given a Bayesian Network model which en-
codes the dependencies between different random variables
characterising the system, the goal is to infer the model, i.e,
estimate the probabilities of interest. The model should encode
all probabilistic information that will permit to calculate all
marginal, conditional and joint probabilities. However, com-
puting these probabilities exactly, in some cases is NP hard,
and is dependent on the graph structure. In this work, we
focus on variable elimination algorithm, an exact inference
algorithm. Given the probability distribution across random
variables xi, we want to compute the marginal probability of
xn by summing across all the other variables, i.e,
p(xn) =
∑
x1
· · ·
∑
xn−1
p(x1, . . . , xn) (5)
Instead of directly computing the above, we utilise the factori-
sation of joint probability distribution, p(x1, x2, . . . , xn) given
in Equation 3.
p(xn) =
∑
xn−1
p(xn | xn−1)
∑
xn−2
p(xn−1 | xn−2) · · ·
∑
x1
p(x2 | x1)p(x1)
(6)
The summation first eliminates the random variables by sum-
ming them from x1 till xn−1. For each summation, the
complexity is about O(k2) where k is the possible values for
each random variable. Overall, given n such random variables
the complexity is about O(nk2).
Reducing Entropy of Black Box Model. The subjective
notion of probability used in Bayesian Networks can be mod-
elled using reduction in entropy [9]. Various attacks performed
on the target machine learning model, leaks some attribute
of the target model which reduces the overall entropy of the
black box model. In other words, we can define reduction
in uncertainty due to model extraction attacks as the amount
of information that the adversary acquires on performing
various attacks on the target model. Let X be a discrete
Random Variable denoting the inferred attribute, taking values
x1, · · · , xn with probability P (X = xi) = P (xi). This can be
quantified using the Shannon Entropy of the random variable
X ,
H(X) = −
∑
i
P (xi)logP (xi) (7)
Given some prior evidence, the information influences the
probability distribution of the hypthesis variable, i.e, there
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is a flow of information from the information variables to
the hypothesis variables. Given two random variables X
and Y , the joint probability H(X,Y ) satisfies the following
relationship,
H(X,Y ) = H(X |Y ) +H(Y ) (8)
where,
H(X |Y ) = H(Y |X) +H(X)−H(Y ) (9)
Here, H(X) represents the represents the prior uncertainty
while H(X |Y ) represents the updated or posterior uncertainty
given the evidence Y . Further, to specifically measure the
uncertainty a particular attack reduces about the black box
model, we can compute the mutual information I(X ;Y ) as,
I(X ;Y ) =
∑
i
∑
j
P (xi, yj)log
P (xi, yj)
P (xi)P (yj)
(10)
The Mutual Information captures the uncertainty reduced
given Random variable Y with respect to uncertainty in X .
III. MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS
DEFINITION 2. Given a black box target Neural Network,
the goal of the adversary is to search for a substitute model
fsubstitute ∈ S, where S is the search space for all possible
models with different hyperparameters, such that the func-
tionality of ftarget approximates fsubstitute using minimum
possible queries.
The test accuracy given by,
Rtest =
1
| D |
∑
(x,y)∈D
d(ftarget(x) − fsubstitute(x))
2 (11)
is used to compute the difference between the two models
ftarget and fsubstitute for inputs (x, y) sampled from the
data(D), i.e, (x, y) ∼ D and d is the distance function between
the two models. Model extraction attacks can be broadly
classified into machine learning based attribute inference
and exploiting information from side channel leakage. These
attack enable the adversary to infer a subset of attributes to
identify and design the model architecture to be close to the
target model which reduces the complexity to achieve similar
functionality.
For modelling these attacks as part of the Bayesian Frame-
work, we categorise them into different groups based on the
common attack approach and the model attributes inferred.
Equation Solving Attacks. Given large number of input-
output pairs (x, f(x)), a good approximation of function f can
be obtained by solving system of equations [34]. Further, we
can model a system of equation containing the regularisation
hyperparameter from the objective function which is overde-
termined, allowing to extract the hyperparameter on solving
the equation by solving using least square method to find an
approximate solution [35]. Solving large number of equations,
however, requires large number of queries to the target model.
ML against ML. Machine Learning models can be trained
to predict model attributes from the inputs and corresponding
output predictions [26]. Several machine learning models
are trained to infer target model attributes from the output
predictions. This however, requires significant computation
time to train all the machine learning models. Alternatively,
a synthetic training dataset for the substitute model can be
generated by passing inputs(x) to the target model and using
the corresponding predictions(f(x)) as labels instead of the
true labels(y) [27].
Timing Side Channel. For a weak adversary with no
knowledge about the target model, it is possible to infer the
number of layers by computing the total execution time of
the network [10]. The attack is based on the idea that all
the nodes in a single layer are computed in parallel while
all the layers are computed sequentially due to which the total
execution time is strongly correlated to the number of layers.
Unlike other attacks, timing attack requires constant number
of queries to the black box model and can be performed in a
complete black box setting.
Hardware Side Channel Attacks. An adversary with
physical access to the hardware can monitor the memory
access patterns during the model execution on the hardware
(memory side channel) as well as exploit shared resources
between processes to extract the process details (cache side
channel). Memory side channels reveal the dimensions for the
filters for individual layers, type of layer, dimensions of each
layer and the connections [18][33][17]. Notably, other hard-
ware details like hardware performance counters, cache misses
and instruction and data flow can reveal significant internal
model details running on these hardware [25]. Alternatively,
exploiting shared resources between target model process and
an attacker process, an adversary can monitor the number of
calls, the size of matrix dimensions to identify the number
of layers and hyperparameter details in the Neural Network
[16]. Further, cache attacks can distinguish different activation
function like relu, sigmoid and tanh by monitoring the probe
addresses [38]. Identifying these model attributes drastically
reduces the overall search space to find a model close to the
target model.
Power Side Channel. During the execution of the neural
network on hardware, a strong adversary with physical access
to the target hardware, can monitor the power consumed to
infer details about the number of parameters in each layers,
values of each parameters, total number of layers and the type
of activation function [4]. Given the power consumption traces,
the attacker uses algorithms like differential power analysis,
correlated power analysis and horizontal power analysis to
infer the target black box model details [20].
IV. AIRAVATA FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe our proposed Bayesian Frame-
work and different cause-effect relationships between various
attacks and the inferred model attributes. For the structure of
the Bayesian Networks, we do not use a structure learning
algorithm since the number of nodes are less and the model is
simple. Figure 1 shows the proposed Bayesian Network Graph
with the attack nodes at the top layer followed by the inferred
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Attacks
Attributes
EquationSolving TimingSC PowerSC MLvsML HardwareSC
Learning Hyperparameters Parameters Depth Activation Nodes Layer Type
Model Knowledge
Fig. 1: AIRAVATA Framework for Model Extraction: The probabilistic Bayesian Network model accounts for various Model Extraction
Attacks and the corresponding attributes inferred. Each node in the network is considered as a random variable with some uncertainty. Based
on the total number of attributes inferred, the final model knowledge is estimated based on the subjective notion of probability.
attributes and finally the knowledge of the model extracted by
the adversary. The model knowledge on the last layer is the
hypothesis variable whose values are unobservable but is of
interest to our problem. The attack nodes in the top layers are
the information variables where the values are observed and
influence the final result for the random variable of interest.
The information variables are linked to the hypothesis variable
through intermediary variables which indicate the inferred
attributes. There exists a causal relationship between different
layers of the Bayesian Network.
A. Sources of Uncertainty
Uncertainty in model extraction occurs at two levels: (a)
while inferring model attributes by performing an attack and
(b) using the inferred attributes to reconstruct an approximate
architecture using stochastic learning algorithms. While per-
forming the model extraction attack and inferring individual
attributes, variability of experimental measurement while using
machine learning models to infer target model attributes could
result in experimental uncertainty in both side channel based
extraction attacks and machine learning based attacks. Further,
while training the attack models, there exists parameter un-
certainty where the model parameters are optimised and exact
values are unknown (stochastic). These inherent uncertainty
in machine learning approaches[24] can lead to imprecision
in inferring the extracted model attributes. Using the inferred
attributes to learn the approximate architecture, cannot give
the exact results close to the target model as no single
attack can infer the entire model with complete certainty
and each attack infers only a subset of the overall model
attributes. Hence, uncertainty exists while identifying the exact
target model which is unknown for an adversary. Quantifying
this uncertainty probabilistically allows to determine the best
possible performance of the substitute architecture that the
adversary can achieve compared to the target model based
on the degree of knowledge that the attacker has inferred.
B. Adversary Models
Adversary models can be classified into Black Box and
White Box adversary based on the knowledge about the target
model. We consider three adversary models based on the
adversary strength and influence which determines whether
the attacker has physical access to the hardware running the
target model or not.
Adversary 1 (remote) adversary is weak and does not
have physical access to the underlying target model hardware.
Instead the adversary can query the target model through an
API interface, where given an input image the attacker will
receive the corresponding output prediction.
Adversary 2 (side channel) adversary has physical access
to the underlying hardware or has relatively strong influence
over the target model. For example, the adversary in this case
can monitor the memory access patter and measure the side
channel information leakage.
Adversary 3 (hypothetical) has both API and physical
access and hence can combine and evaluate the attacks done
by both Adversary 1 and Adversary 2.
In all the cases, regardless of the strength and influence,
the adversary does not have any knowledge about the target
model and the goal of the attacker is to infer details about the
black box algorithm.
C. Attack Variables
Within our framework, let each of the above attacks be
represented by random variables A={A1, · · · , An}. Each of
the random variable Ai is binary, i.e, it can have only two
states: the attack was performed or not performed. Formally,
each binary Attack random variable Ai ∈ {0, 1} where
P (A = Ai) = 1 represents attack was performed while
P (A = Ai) = 0 indicates attack was not performed. These
are informational random variables the value of which is
observable and influences the hypothesis random variable, i.e,
the final model knowledge extracted by the attacker.
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TABLE I: Notations and variables for AIRAVATA framework for
quantifying model leakage in extraction attacks.
Symbol Description
A Binary Attack Variables
M Inferred Target Model Variables
K Knowledge Hypothesis Variable
Attack Variables
HWSC Hardware Side Channel Attack
PowerSC Power Side Channel Attack
TimingSC Timing Side Channel Attack
MLvML Machine Learning based Attacks
EqSolve Equation Solving Attacks
Attribute Variables
Depth Total Layers in the Neural Network
Parameters Weights (θ) corresponding to the trained target model
Nodes Parameters corresponding to each layer
LayerType Types of Layers used in the Network
Learning hyperparameter Learning Rate, Reguarization hyperparameter, Momentum
Activation Type of activation function: ReLU, Sigmoid, Tanh
D. Inferred Model Attributes
There are some attributes which can be computed using
other hyperparameters. We assume each attack infers individ-
ual model attributes independently, i.e, all the inferred model
attributes are independent of each other and are inferred using
during the attack separately.
Each attack reveals certain model attributes. For examples,
timing side channel attack reveals the total number of layers
in the Neural Network while hardware side channel attack
reveals fine grained details about the model like type of
activation used, number of layers in the network, parameters
(dimensions of individual network) and the different types of
layers (convolution, maxpool or fully connected). The degree
of knowledge extracted by the two attacks will be drastically
different which our proposed model should capture. There
exists a cause-effect relationship between the attacks Ai ∈ A
and the inferred attributes Mi ∈M.
Formally, let each of the model attribute
M={M1, · · · ,Mn}. Each of the above random variable
takes a discrete value, i.e, if a given attack Ai ∈ A does
not infer a particular model attribute Mj ∈ M then the
corresponding value of P (M = Mj) = 0. However, in
case, a particular attribute is inferred by a given attack,
then the corresponding attribute inferred Mj takes value
P (M =Mj) = 1.
E. Computing the Degree of the Knowledge Extracted
The ultimate goal is to infer the hypothesis random variable,
i.e, the degree of knowledge extracted K. Given the different
attributes, the final knowledge acquired is computed based
on the number of attributes correctly inferred out of the
total attributes. We compute P (K|A) is the probability of the
hypothesis random variable K given the evidence of the attack
performed(information variables) A. The resultant probability
of the hypothesis variable indicates the degree of knowledge
about the model inferred by performing model extraction
attacks. By evaluating different combination of attacks one can
probabilistically infer the model information leakage using on
the knowledge acquired.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, our goal is to design and evaluate the
Bayesian Network on data generated for model extraction
attacks. We implement the Bayesian Network in pgmpy1
library in python language and design the structure of the
Bayesian Network subjectively using expert knowledge as
shown in Figure 1.
A. Dataset
The dataset contains different attacks, corresponding at-
tributes and the overall knowledge inferred. We consider
the attack and corresponding attributes inferred to be binary
variables, i.e, the attack can either be performed or not (”yes”
or ”no”) based on which the corresponding attributes are
inferred. This dataset considers five attack types: Hardware
Side Channels (HWSC), Power Side Channel (PowerSC), Ma-
chine Learning based attacks (MLvML), Timing Side Channel
(TimingSC) and Equation Solving (EqSolve) attack. The total
attack combinations are hence, 25 and the dataset has all the
labels as discrete. In case of the parameters or attributes,
since we specifically consider Neural Networks, we have
six attributes, namely, Depth of the Network, the learning
hyperparameter such as the regularization hyperparameter (λ),
number of nodes in each layer, the activation function used,
the types of layers (convolution, fully connected, maxpool) and
finally the parameter values which determine the functionality
of the black box models. Th final knowledge extracted is clas-
sified into three categories based on the number of attributes
inferred. If all the possible six attributes are inferred based
on the attack combination, then the corresponding knowledge
extracted about the model is labelled is ”High”. On the other
hand, if the number of attributes inferred is between three to
five, then the label is ”Medium” and for all attributes less than
three the output label for knowledge is ”Low”. We use the
Discrete Bayesian network model to learn from the discrete
variable dataset described above.
B. Conditional Independence
The causal relations between different nodes in the Bayesian
Network enables one random variable to influence the proba-
bility distribution of other random variables. In other words,
two random variables X and Y are dependent if observing
the value X influences the subjective probability (belief)
of Y . It is, hence, important to check for the dependency
conditions of the empirical Bayesian model with our subjective
understanding.
Following are the cases for independency in the
Bayesian Network, we wish to verify in the empirical
Bayesian Network model: Common Parent, Cascade and V-
Structure. On checking the model independencies, we ver-
ified that all the attacks type variables are independent
of each other. In other words, for each attack attribute
1https://pgmpy.org/
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Ai ∈ {PowerSC,HWSC,MLvML, T iming,EqSolve},
we found that Ai ⊥ A−i where A−i is all the variables other
than Ai.
C. Inference: Adversary 1
Given the Bayesian Network model which has captured
the uncertainty in model extraction attacks, we want to query
the model and reason about different attacks and their effec-
tiveness based on the belief of their success. In the case of
Adversary 1, we assume that the adversary is weak and has
only remote API access to the target model. In other words,
the adversary can send queries (input images) to the target
model and get the corresponding output predictions. Here,
the adversary can only perform attacks remotely and includes:
Timing Side Channel (TimingSC) attacks, Machine Learning
based attack (MLvML) and Equation Solving (EqSolve) attack
which can be mounted remotely according to their respective
threat models.
Attack Combination
Knowledge Extracted (Leaked)
Low Medium High
MLvML 0.0992 0.7983 0.1024
EqSolve 0.7272 0.1586 0.1142
TimingSC 0.7681 0.1178 0.1141
MLvML + EqSolve 0.0824 0.1822 0.7354
EqSolve + TimingSC 0.1606 0.7262 0.1132
MLvML + TimingSC 0.0992 0.7983 0.1024
MLvML + TimingSC + EqSolve 0.0824 0.1822 0.7354
TABLE II: Adversary 1: Belief in knowledge extracted on perform-
ing different model extraction attacks in a remote black box setting.
The belief of knowledge extracted for remote black box
setting corresponding to Adversary 1 is shown in Table II.
In the remote setting, we can reason that since the number
of attributes inferred by Timing Side Channel and the Equa-
tion Solving attacks are less compared to Machine Learning
based attacks (MLvML), the corresponding belief of extracting
”Low” knowledge is 0.7681 and 0.7272 respectively. While
for strong black box attacks like MLvML, the knowledge
extracted has been classified as ”Medium” with a belief score
of 0.7983.
However, the adversary best benefits from performing the
attacks in combination rather than in isolation. Specifically, as
shown in Table II, we see that the adversary on combining all
the three attacks has a belief score of 0.7354 for ”High” degree
of knowledge extraction, i.e, correctly infer all the attributes
in the network. Interestingly, not performing TimingSC attack
results in the same belief. The reason is that since timing attack
infers only the depth of the network which is also inferred by
MLvML, it des not contribute to any further improvement in
the belief.
In summary, in a black box setting, the adversary’s best
attack combination is MLvML with EqSolve to extract
the maximum possible knowledge about the target model
correctly.
D. Inference: Adversary 2
In case of Adversary 2, we assume a stronger adversary with
physical access to the hardware running the Neural Networks.
Here, the adversary can perform hardware based side channel
attacks such as cache side channels, memory access patterns
and power side channels by monitoring the power consumed
by the hardware during the execution of Neural Networks.
Attack Combination
Knowledge Extracted (Leaked)
Low Medium High
HWSC 0.0992 0.7983 0.1024
PowerSC 0.0894 0.8181 0.0925
HWSC + PowerSC 0.0693 0.8142 0.1166
TABLE III: Adversary 2: Belief in knowledge extracted in the case
where adversary has physical access to the hardware.
Here, we see that the improvement in belief in using
a combination of Hardware Side Channel and Power Side
Channel is not significant compared to performing the attacks
independently (Table III). From this we can reason, that
both these attacks (HWSC and PowerSC) are equally
strong in terms to extracting knowledge from the target
model. However, on combining both the attacks we see that
the overall belief for ”High” knowledge increases from
0.1024 to 0.1166. However, the PowerSC has a higher belief
compared to HWSC and MLvML attack (remote adversary)
where ”Medium” Knowledge extraction is higher (0.8181 to
0.7983).
E. Inference: Adversary 3
The third setting that we consider as part of our framework
is where the adversary has access to both the hardware as well
as the remote API to query the model. This hypothetical setting
allows to combine attacks from different setting together to
estimate the overall belief in extracting the target model
knowledge.
Attack Combination
Knowledge Extracted (Leaked)
Low Medium High
HWSC + EqSolve 0.0824 0.1822 0.7354
PowerSC + EqSolve 0.0893 0.7743 0.1364
HWSC + PowerSC + EqSolve 0.0824 0.1822 0.7354
HWSC + MLvML 0.0992 0.7983 0.1024
PowerSC + MLvML 0.0693 0.8142 0.1166
All Attacks 0.0824 0.1822 0.7354
TABLE IV: Adversary 3: Belief in knowledge extracted in the setting
where the adversary has access to both the hardware executing the
model and the remote API to query the target model.
As shown in Table IV, combining different attacks together,
results in a maximum belief of 0.7354 for extracting ”High”
knowledge about target model. However, the same level of
knolwedge can be inferred by choosing a careful combination
of other attacks. For instance, HWSC + EqSolve and HWSC
+ PowerSC + EqSolve result in the same belief of extracting
the overall knowledge instead of combining all the five
attacks.
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Future Improvements. It is important to note that the
belief is estimated based on the attributes inferred by the
attacks over the total possible attributes. This estimate is hence
same for different attack combinations which provide different
approaches to infer the same number of attributes. As part of
future work, we intend to further provide weightage to each
of the attacks based on metric like accuracy of inferring the
attributes and ease of performing attack to further obtain fine
grained beliefs for the total target model knowledge extracted.
VI. RELATED WORK
Bayesian Networks have been used extensively to model
problems with inherent uncertainty. This has a crucial appli-
cation in cybersecurity threat detection where the uncertainty
of the adversary’s actions have to be taken into account
[37][3][12]. A similar modelling can be done for network
security attacks with various threats and exploits can be
modelled as random variables in Bayesian Network [22].
Further, identifying data privacy risks by monitoring data
access pattern and time duration can provide a tool based on
Bayesian Networks to identify data privacy breaches [2].
Quantifying information leakage by measuring information
flow from systems can help to identify and mitigate infor-
mation leakage. The goal is to identify and quantify leakage
from the system about the inputs from the outputs. This is
particularly helpful for system designer who objective is to
minimise the overall information leakage. Several statistical
and information theoretic measures have been proposed to
quantify this leakage. The state of the art approaches of
quantifying the information leakage rely on frequentist ap-
proach by monitoring the frequency of occurrence of input and
outputs [7]. However, these mathematical measures are based
on white box approaches, i.e, compute the leakage measure
from the conditional probabilities of outputs given the inputs
[8][32][1]. Further, these approaches require large number of
input-output data points and this requirement can be lifted
by using machine learning models to quantify the leakage
[6]. While these measures compute the information leakage
of inputs due to the system from corresponding outputs, we
focus on modelling the black box systems itself and leakage
corresponding to the model parameters and attributes, given
the inputs. This line of research is orthogonal to previously
proposed work on quantifying input leakage based on input-
output relationship using information flow.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Model extraction attacks are a major threat to machine
learning models which violate the privacy and Intellectual
Property of the proprietary machine learning models deployed
by companies. For the first time in literature, we propose to
unify such attacks under a single theoretical framework based
on probabilistic graphical models. This is based on the obser-
vation, that no single attack is able to extract the entire model
with complete certainty and we can quantify the information
leaked (knowledge extracted) by capturing the uncertainty. We
focus on Bayesian Networks and experimentally validate our
model under different adversary assumptions on a synthetic
dataset containing adversary attacks and corresponding model
attributes inferred. This analysis allows to estimate the effi-
ciency of model extraction attacks based on the knowledge
extracted and hence reason about the optimal combination of
attacks that maximises the (model) information leakage. The
proposed mathematical framework can be extended to other
model black box systems like cryptographic protocols.
NOTE ON AIRAVATA: Airavata, in the Indian mythology,
is the five-headed white elephant of the hindu god Indra.
The framework was named based on our initial discussion
which inspired the formulation of the framework. Consider an
elephant and multiple blind people whose goal is to identify
the animal. Each blind person will be able to identify only
certain part of the elephant for instance, the tusk, trunk,
tail, ears and so on. In order to identify the animal, all of
them have to share their findings, despite which, it is not
possible to certainly estimate the animal as an elephant. This
is similar to what we see in model extraction attacks where
each attack (blind person) wants to identify the black box
model (elephant). Due to the uncertainty in the attacks outputs
as well as the stochastic training process, it is unlikely that
the knowledge of the black box model can be extracted with
complete certainty.
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